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ADDRESSING CORPORATE SHORT-TERMISM  
THROUGH LOYALTY SHARES 
P. ALEXANDER QUIMBY?
ABSTRACT
 The classic concept of patient investing and long-term corporate governance has largely 
disappeared. Dispersed investors with long-term investment horizons have been replaced by 
concentrated institutional investors, which trade and control corporations solely for the short-
term. This new model of investment and corporate governance (deemed “short-termism”) has a 
negative impact on society as a whole and has been blamed for recent financial crises and a 
lack of investment in research and development.   
 Although others have addressed short-termism, their efforts generally avoid providing 
actual solutions to the problem. This Note fills that void: it provides a model for promoting 
long-term investment and corporate governance, while not eliminating the benefits conferred 
by short-term trading. This goal can be accomplished by making a “loyalty shares” provision 
available to public corporations. By adopting a loyalty shares provision, the gains generated 
from the sale of that corporation’s stock would be subject to a periodically reduced capital 
gains tax rate over time, while the voting rights attached to that stock would be periodically 
enhanced over time. Adoption of the provision would entice more shareholders to invest for 
the long-term, while also increasing these long-term shareholders’ control over the corpora-
tion. Mindful of the experiences of European and Canadian companies that use other types 
of control-enhancing mechanisms, this proposal contains several features which avoid the 
pitfalls inherent in an uncapped system of enhanced voting rights.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Although the American corporation1 originated as a vehicle to 
promote the public good,2 that primary purpose slowly eroded and 
                                                                                                                  
? J.D. 2012, summa cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would 
like to thank Professor Jay Kesten for his insightful comments and suggestions through-
out the development of this piece. I am also grateful to Professor Steve R. Johnson for his 
valuable feedback.  
 1. For the sake of consistency, I refer to United States publicly traded companies  
as “corporations” throughout this paper, although they can exist in other forms. See, e.g.,
FAQs, KKR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LLC, http://ir.kkr.com/kfn_ir/kfn_faq.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2013). 
2. See William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth Century Corporation: A 
Match Made in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023, 1028 (1998) (explaining how, 
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gave way to a new fixation: increasing shareholder wealth.3 This shift 
in purpose is particularly important due to the significant role public 
corporations play in the United States: in the economic context, the 
increasing interconnectedness of markets has allowed Wall Street to 
substantially affect Main Street;4 politically, the Supreme Court’s 
controversial Citizens United5 decision opened the door even wider 
than before for large corporations to wield great influence through 
political spending;6 and the products, services, and messages of these 
corporations help shape American (and world) culture.7 Yet even as 
the goal of individual corporations has changed, the justification for 
their existence is still premised—at least in part—on the belief that 
they confer an overall benefit to society.8
                                                                                                                  
historically, states granted authority to public and private corporations to undertake spe-
cific activities, and how even private corporations “existed largely to serve a public good”). 
 3. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Ille-
gality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 
VA. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2001) (describing the prominent view that corporations and man-
agers have a duty to maximize value for shareholders); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom 
and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regula-
tion of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 264 (2008) (“[T]he American corpo-
rate law question of the corporation’s purpose has been settled in favour of stockholders.”).  
 4. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Finan-
cial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 10 (2009) (“Rippling effects from a worsening economy 
have trickled down from Wall Street into Main Street as the capital markets—the pipes 
through which money flows to finance student loans, car loans, home loans, family 
needs, and small businesses' payroll and inventory – [sic] fell victim to the credit  
freeze. These drastic events have reverberated far beyond the trading floors of Wall 
Street and board rooms of corporate America, as almost no industry has been spared  
as the crisis that first emerged in the subprime mortgage market metastasized.”);  
John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703436504574640523013840290.html (not-
ing that in recent decades “the financial sector became the driving force in the U.S. economy”).   
 5. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 6. The Court struck down a federal law banning corporations from using their gen-
eral treasury funds to make independent, election-related expenditures. Id. at 913; see also
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) in 156 CONG. REC.
H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“I believe [the Court’s decision] will open the floodgates for 
special interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections. I don’t think American elec-
tions should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests . . . .”); Ofer Raban, Constitu-
tionalizing Corruption: Citizens United, Its Conceptions of Political Corruption, and the Im-
plications for Judicial Elections Campaigns, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 359, 382 (2011) (interpreting 
the Court’s decision as the “constitutionalization of political corruption”). 
 7. See Jena McGregor, The World’s Most Influential Companies, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 10, 2008), http://images.businessweek.com/ss/08/12/1211_most_ 
influential/2.htm (listing American public companies Apple, Wal-Mart, Google, Microsoft, 
and others as among the most influential in the world).  
 8. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARA-
TIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 28 (2d ed. 2009) (stating the normative “objective of cor-
porate law–as of any branch of law—is presumably to serve the interests of society as a 
whole”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act 
and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2010) (“I believe that the generation of durable 
wealth for its stockholders through fundamentally sound economic activity, such as the 
sale of useful products and services, is the primary goal of the for-profit corporation. . . . 
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 But over the last several decades the manner in which public cor-
porations operate has changed drastically, in a way that threatens 
the nation’s long-term well-being. The familiar concept of public stock 
being owned by individual American citizens has largely disap-
peared.9 Instead, institutional investors—entities that pool together 
and then invest the money of numerous end-user investors (both 
companies and individuals)—are now the dominant holders of public 
stock and wield substantial influence over corporate boards of direc-
tors.10 The rise of institutional investors has coincided with the rise of 
short-termism: the practice of short-term investing by shareholders 
and short-term business decisions by directors and managers at the 
expense of long-term corporate sustainability.11 It was this type of 
short-termism that contributed to recent financial crises12 and also 
poses serious problems for the nation going forward, including a lack 
of investment in research and development (R&D) and increased 
market volatility.13
 Although Congress, scholars, and other commentators have 
sought to alleviate the problem of short-termism, their efforts have 
largely been either misguided or too passive. For example, the Dodd-
Frank Act and other legislative measures endorsed increased share-
holder empowerment as a way to ameliorate short-termism, yet ig-
nored the fact that the very shareholders they were empowering had 
primarily short-term interests.14 Others have often devoted their time 
                                                                                                                  
The hoped-for outcome of this risk taking, in the aggregate, is an increase in societal 
wealth, and not simply through the generation of profits. Rather, to generate profits, corpo-
rations have an incentive to employ workers and develop innovative products and services, 
and to engage in other activities that increase societal wealth.”).  
 9. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008) (“This situation [where most shareholders were individu-
als] has changed dramatically with the rise of the ‘institutional investor.’ ”). 
 10. See id. at 1275-76 (describing how “[i]nstitutions have captured a larger and larg-
er share of the total market for public equities over time” and “are in a much more favora-
ble position to play an activist role in corporate governance than dispersed individual  
investors are”). 
 11. See Strine, supra note 8, at 10-11 (describing short-termism and stating “institu-
tional investors often have a myopic concern for short-term performance” and short-term 
“trading patterns give fund managers little reason to think deeply about the effect of corpo-
rate governance proposals on long-term corporate performance”).  
 12. See THE CONFERENCE. BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.conference-board.org/ 
pdf_free/SR-03-04.pdf (“The Commission believes that managing for short-term earnings 
and stock price results has led to many of the behaviors and manipulations that have re-
sulted in the recent corporate crises and loss of investor confidence.”). 
 13. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.  
 14. See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership 
from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1822-23 (2011) (describing Dodd-Frank and its 
bailout antecedents as “misguided and counterproductive[,]” and noting “[e]ach regulatory 
measure fails to take account of the short-termist shareholder problem”). The SEC’s pro-
posed Rule 14a-11 would have addressed short-termism, as it required proxy materials to 
include a candidate nominated by a group (or individual) of shareholders who have contin-
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to analyzing why short-termism is a problem without providing a so-
lution15 or have offered only general guidance, rather than specific 
proposals, for policy-makers to adopt.16
 In this Note, I propose a plan that would reduce short-termism to 
a healthy level. This proposal advocates for the availability of a “loy-
alty shares” provision to public corporations. If a corporation adopts a 
loyalty shares provision, the gains generated when an investor sells 
that corporation’s common stock would be subject to a periodically 
reduced capital gains tax rate, while the voting rights attached to 
that stock would be periodically enhanced. The immediate result of 
this proposal would be a renewed focus on long-term corporate 
health; the broader result would be a corporate sector that is more 
prosperous, stable, and beneficial to society.  
II. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND SHORT-TERMISM
 Both the identity of shareholders and how they invest changed 
drastically during the twentieth century. Historically, shareholders 
were dispersed individuals with modest holdings of public stock.17
Because shareholders elect directors and directors make business 
decisions that are carried out by their managers, scholars of the time 
were largely concerned with the inability of shareholders to exert in-
fluence over the corporations they owned.18 Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
                                                                                                                  
uously held at least 3% of the voting power for at least three years. See Bus. Roundtable v. 
SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But the rule was invalidated. Id. at 1148. 
 15. See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 14, at 1866 (“This Article makes no attempt to 
offer a grand solution to the resulting problems [of short-termism]. Instead, it focuses on 
bringing those problems into clearer view.”); Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-
Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2011) (stating “the problem of short-termism 
is very real” but focusing on why managers focus on the short-term, why a company would 
benefit from short-term management, and how short-termism falsely inflates a company’s 
stock price). 
 16. See, e.g., David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of 
Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 435, 467-71 (2010) (stating “[this article] analyzes and 
critiques existing regulatory proposals, and, although not endorsing a regulatory solution,
offers two ideas that policy makers should consider” and “[g]iven the considerable uncer-
tainty . . . caution is warranted in drafting any potential regulations”) (emphasis added); 
Strine, supra note 8, at 2 (suggesting “some modest moves toward addressing this substan-
tial policy dilemma”); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & John P. DiTomo, Practicing Law Institute, 
The Short-Term vs. Long-Term Dilemma, in NINTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS' INSTITUTE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 125, 136-37, (2011) (outlining general steps which can be taken 
to address short-termism—including preferential tax treatment, encouraging “directors  
to become educated about the benefits of long-term thinking[,]” attaching “stockholder 
participation rights to minimum holding requirements[,]” and requiring greater disclosure 
in certain situations—but not elaborating on the best methods for these proposals to  
be implemented). 
 17. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1275 (describing the shareholder power-
lessness that resulted from “dispersed small investors whose individual interests were so 
small that it did not make sense for any single one of them, alone, to take an active role in  
corporate affairs”).  
 18. Id. at 1274-75. 
2013]            ADDRESSING CORPORATE SHORT-TERMISM 393
Means famously characterized the weak control shareholders pos-
sessed as a “separation of ownership and control.”19 Over the years, 
common reform efforts aimed at narrowing that separation included 
increasing proxy access and disclosure.20
 But the classic portrait of dispersed, weak shareholders slowly 
changed.21 Individual investors were gradually replaced with institu-
tional investors.22 These new pooled investment vehicles came in 
many shapes, sizes, and names: including mutual, hedge, pension, 
insurance, and index funds.23 The rise of institutional investors over 
the last seventy-five years has been startling. In 1950, institutional 
investors held only 8% of outstanding public stock.24 That number 
skyrocketed to 51% by 2000, 61% by 2005,25 and reached nearly 70% 
of all public stock in 2010.26 Of that number, mutual funds alone con-
trol 26%, while private pension plans and government pension plans 
own 11% and 9%, respectively.27
 The rise of institutional investors may initially seem like a posi-
tive. Because institutional investors aggregate tremendous amounts 
of stock and, consequently, tremendous amounts of votes, they are 
better positioned than their dispersed predecessors to play an activist 
role in corporate governance.28 This reality suggests Berle and 
Means’s concern with the separation of ownership from control is 
outdated.29 Indeed, examples of institutional investors accomplishing 
their goals include changing CEO compensation to be primarily tied 
to their corporations’ stock price, widespread adoption of majority 
voting statutes, and huge stock buyback programs.30
                                                                                                                  
 19. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 70, 84 (1932). 
 20. See Rodrigues, supra note 14, at 1822. 
 21. See id. at 1828.  
 22. Id.
 23. See G. William Domhoff, Pension Fund Capitalism or Wall Street Bonanza?,
WHO RULES AMERICA? (Apr. 2010), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/ 
pension_fund_capitalism.html.  
 24. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1275.  
 25. Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Continue to  
Boost Ownership of U.S. Corps. 1 (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with The Business Lawyer), avail-
able at http://www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/ 
01-22-2007/0004510379&EDATE=. 
 26. Bogle, supra note 4. 
 27. Id.
 28. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1276.  
 29. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/ 
(“[T]here is now a separation of ‘ownership from ownership’ that creates conflicts of its own 
that are analogous to those of the paradigmatic, but increasingly outdated, Berle-Means 
model for separation of ownership from control.”).  
 30. See Strine, supra note 8, at 14-16 (detailing some of the changes achieved by  
institutional investors).  
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 But while the problem evidenced by Berle and Means’s characteri-
zation has declined, a new characterization—replete with its own 
problems—has emerged. Corporate governance is now faced with a 
“separation of ‘ownership from ownership.’ ”31 One difficulty is that 
the existing model of corporate law focuses solely on the fiduciary 
duties corporate managers owe to their shareholders, to the exclusion 
of the end-users who fund those shareholders.32 Moreover, institu-
tional investors may invest in a manner inconsistent with their end-
users’ long-term goals.33 Also, “in most institutions the persons 
charged with making investment decisions have relatively little or no 
responsibility for voting the institution’s portfolio shares.”34 The fact 
that many institutional investors rely on the voting advice of proxy 
advisory firms adds even more separation between end-users and 
boards of directors.35
 But while those problems are concerning, the most serious threat 
to American public corporations stems from their shareholders’ in-
vestment time horizons. Just as the existence of individual investors 
gradually gave way to institutional investors,36 the reality of patient, 
long-term investing acquiesced to short-termism.37 As institutional 
investors competed to attract new end-users every quarter by posting 
the most impressive returns,38 their portfolios began turning over at 
                                                                                                                  
 31. See Strine, supra note 29.  
 32. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 1265 (describing how, generally, officers 
and directors only owe fiduciary duties to shareholders); Strine, supra note 8, at 10 (“The 
existing model of corporate law focuses solely on the duties managers owe to stockholders. 
It does not address the reality that most ‘stockholders’ are now themselves a form of agen-
cy, being institutional investors who represent end-user investors.”). In describing the dis-
parity between directors and end-users, Vanguard founder John Bogle wrote: “[I]n this 
Alice-in-Wonderland world of the financial markets, the investor feeds at the bottom of the 
food chain.” Bogle, supra note 4.  
 33. See Strine, supra note 8, at 12 (“The focus of many of these institutions on quar-
terly earnings and other short-term metrics is fundamentally inconsistent with the objec-
tives of most of their end-user investors, people saving primarily for two purposes, to put 
their kids through college and to fund their own retirements. These end-user investors  
do not care about quarterly earnings or short-term gimmicks. These end-user investors 
want corporations to produce sustainable wealth that will be there when they need it.”)  
(footnotes omitted). 
 34. Charles M. Nathan, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and  
Institutional Voting, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN.
REG. (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/ 
the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and-institutional-voting/ (stating that,  
although this practice is not universal, “it is by far the prevailing paradigm”). 
 35. Id. (detailing the range of practices used by some fund managers, “from outsourc-
ing the mechanics for actually voting shares . . . , to making recommendations on how to 
vote all portfolio companies’ shares on all matters brought to shareholder meetings, to  
exercising discretionary proxy authority to vote the portfolio companies’ shares without 
reference to the investment manager”).  
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. 
 37. See supra text accompanying note 11.  
 38. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 580 (2006) (“[W]idespread availability of information on fund performance[] has led 
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an alarming rate. “In 2009, the average stock turnover appears to 
have exceeded 250% (changed hands two and a half times), compared to 
78% a decade ago, and 21% barely 30 years ago.”39 Mutual funds—which 
are the primary 401(k) contribution investors for Americans40—turn 
over 117% of their stock portfolio a year,41 while hedge funds turn over 
300% annually.42 The presence of short-termism from other vantage 
points is also readily apparent. The stockholder base of public com-
panies now turns over nearly 100% every year.43 On the New York 
Stock Exchange, stocks were held for—on average—between five and 
nine years from 1945 to 1975, for three years by 1980, and for less 
than one year by 2005.44 Overall, the average holding period for 
United States equities is just six months.45
 But the proliferation of institutional investors has broader conse-
quences than just short-term trading; it also impacts corporate gov-
ernance. These short-term investors are unlikely to be concerned 
with, much less promote, policies that are beneficial to the corpora-
tion in the long-term.46 When shareholders have short-term goals, 
they elect directors with similar interests and apply subsequent pres-
sure to ensure these goals are met.47 This results in managers engag-
                                                                                                                  
to pressure on mutual fund managers to maximize short-term returns at the expense of 
any longer-term focus in order to attract and retain investors.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Should 
a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 18 
(2004) (describing how institutional investors “seek quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year 
performance statistics that are better than those of their peers”). 
 39. Bogle, supra note 4.  
 40. See Strine, supra note 8, at 10.  
 41. Brian Reid & Kimberlee Millar, Mutual Funds and Portfolio Turnover, INVEST-
MENT COMPANY INSTITUTE (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_v1n2.pdf; see also 
Strine, supra note 8, at 10 n. 32. 
 42. Strine, supra note 8, at 10. 
 43. Id. at 17. 
 44. See MICHAEL C. THOMSETT, GETTING STARTED IN STOCK INVESTING AND TRADING
99-100 (2011). Furthermore, the annual turnover of stocks traded on the NYSE reached 
over 138% in 2008, compared to 88% in 2000 and 36% in 1980. See Strine, supra note 8, at 
10 n.32, 11 n.35.  
 45. Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 129.  
 46. See BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A
CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 
(2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/ 
overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf (“[F]und managers with a primary focus on short-term 
trading gains have little reason to care about long-term corporate performance or external-
ities, and so are unlikely to exercise a positive role in promoting corporate policies . . . that 
are beneficial and sustainable in the long-term.”). Note that the coalition who provided this 
report was comprised of many influential investors, including Warren Buffett and John 
Bogle. Id.
 47. See Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over 
Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207, 229 (2001) (presenting empirical evidence 
that short-term institutions “exhibit preferences consistent with a short-term focus, sup-
porting [the] view that this type of investor is most likely to create pressure for strong 
short-term earnings performance”).   
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ing in short-term tactics at the expense of long-term strategies.48 Ad-
ditionally, institutional investors who tend to focus on short-term 
performance are associated with low information quality,49 as well as 
weak monitoring and a weak bargaining position in acquisitions.50     
 Of course, just because there has been a fundamental shift in how 
shareholders invest and control corporate governance does not, in 
and of itself, tell us that the overall effect is negative. After all, high 
frequency trading increases liquidity and market efficiency, while 
reducing trading costs through increased competition.51 And at least 
two authors have concluded that short-term trading by institutional 
investors is positively related to future stock returns and earnings.52
But while short-term trading and corporate governance can confer 
some benefits on the market, widespread short-termism delivers 
overwhelmingly negative effects.  
III.   WHY SHORT-TERMISM MUST BE CONFRONTED 
 “[I]n the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long 
run it is a weighing machine.”  
       -Benjamin Graham53
                                                                                                                  
 48. See MERCER & THE IRRC INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT HORIZONS: DO MANAGERS DO
WHAT THEY SAY? 15, available at http://www.ifa.com/articles/Mercer_IRRC_Study.pdf  
(reporting, in a case study analysis of fund managers, that “[w]hen the discussion turned 
from the implications for them as fund managers to the wider market impacts, almost all 
the managers observed that short-termism can encourage short-term thinking among cor-
porations, which can distract corporate directors from their strategy and potentially un-
dermine long-term shareholder value”); Strine, supra note 8, at 16 (“As a whole, institu-
tional investors have pushed for corporate managers to be highly responsive to the imme-
diate pressures and incentives of the capital markets[,]” which can result in “an agenda 
that [does not] appropriately focus[] on the long term . . . .”). 
 49. See Natasha Burns et al., Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from 
Financial Misreporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 443 (2010) (“[T]he likelihood and severity of 
financial misreporting is positively related to aggregate institutional ownership and this 
effect can be largely attributed to ownership by institutions with short investment hori-
zons—those with little incentive to engage in costly monitoring of firm activities and pre-
cisely those that sell at the announcement of a [financial] restatement.”). 
 50. See José-Miguel Gaspar et al., Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market 
for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 135-36 (2005). 
 51. See Cameron Smith, Commentary: How High Frequency Trading Benefits All In-
vestors, TRADERS MAG. ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/ 
high-frequency-trading-benefits-105365-1.html?zkPrintable=true.  
 52. See Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Re-
turns: Are Short-Term Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 893, 893 (2009) 
(“[T]he positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns . . . is 
driven by short-term institutions. Furthermore, short-term institutions’ trading forecasts 
future stock returns. . . . Short-term institutions’ trading is also positively related to future 
earnings surprises.”). 
 53. Jason Zweig, Commentary on BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR:
THE DEFINITIVE BOOK ON VALUE INVESTING 477 (rev. ed. 2003). Graham’s description of the 
market highlights one of the problems underlying short-termism: The ability of short-run 
price movements to be driven by factors unrelated to the corporation’s actual intrinsic value.  
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 The pervasiveness of short-termism among institutional investors 
challenges one of the basic rationales for how the corporate structure 
is designed: Shareholder voting rights are premised on the theory 
that shareholders have an interest in increasing the firm’s long-term 
profitability.54 Shareholders’ incentives are supposed to be aligned 
with the maximization of firm profitability because they are residual 
claimants.55 “But in corporate polities, unlike nation-states, the citi-
zenry can easily depart and not ‘eat their own cooking.’ As a result, 
there is a danger that activist stockholders will make proposals moti-
vated by interests other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable 
profitability of the corporation.”56
 The question that must be asked is, “What long-term policies will 
corporations give up to appease short-term shareholders?” One of the 
most concerning answers is investment in research and develop-
ment.57 When a corporation’s stock is owned “by institutions that 
have high portfolio turnover and engage in momentum trading . . . 
the probability that managers [will] reduce R&D [investment] to re-
verse an earnings decline” significantly increases.58 In contrast, high 
proportions of ownership by institutions with low portfolio turnover 
and longer-term holdings have “no incremental impact” on the likeli-
hood of cuts in R&D.59
 The inverse relationship between short-termism and R&D in-
vestment is especially concerning when viewed alongside other R&D 
trends. Over the years, the scientific and technological advances 
made by United States companies have created new industries, new 
jobs, and an improved standard of living for Americans.60 But in the 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See Strine, supra note 8, at 8 (“The rights given to stockholders to make proposals 
and vote on corporate business are premised on the theory that stockholders have an inter-
est in increasing the sustainable profitability of the firm.”).   
 55. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 470 (2002) 
(“[S]hareholders have the strongest economic incentive to care about the size of the residu-
al claim, which means they have the greatest incentive to elect directors committed to max-
imizing firm profitability.”). 
 56. Strine, supra note 8, at 8.  
 57. Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Invest-
ment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 305 (1998); see also Strine, supra note 8, at 3 (“To build 
wealth in a durable manner, corporations need to commit capital to long-term endeavors, 
often involving a lag time between the investment of capital and the achievement of profit, 
a long time during which activities like research and development occur.”). 
 58. See Bushee, supra note 57, at 305. 
 59. See id. at 310-11, 328-30. 
 60. See Nat’l Sci. Bd., Research and Development: Essential Foundation for U.S.  
Competitiveness in a Global Economy, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/start.htm (“The scientific and technological advances 
that have led to our Nation’s remarkable ability to create new industries and jobs, improve 
the standard of living for people, and provide sophisticated technology that ensures our 
national security can be traced back to the outcomes of basic research.”). 
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past decade industry support for its own basic research has stagnated.61
Meanwhile, the federal government has decreased its support of aca-
demic R&D and basic research.62 These reductions could have serious 
implications on the ability of the United States to compete for highly 
skilled and manufacturing jobs at home and in international mar-
kets.63 Overall, the continued rise of short-termist institutional inves-
tors and the decline in R&D investment which accompanies it is likely 
to exacerbate this problem in the future.  
 Short-term corporate governance can also result in corporations 
foregoing other important long-term strategies. For example, corpo-
rations may be too impatient to wait for appropriate regulatory ap-
proval before bringing new products into the market.64 Corporations 
may also choose to generate short-term earnings at the expense of 
building crucial new factories65 or making other necessary capital in-
vestments.66 Additionally, managers may terminate workers if it will 
result in an increase in short-term earnings.67
 Besides short-termism’s negative influence on corporate govern-
ance, excessive short-term trading can also directly cause problems 
in the market. The intense focus on short-term speculation has 
caused stock prices, rather than more reliable fundamentals, to take 
center stage in the eyes of many investors.68 One result has been an 
increase in volatility, in that “stocks that are mostly held by short[-
term] investors experience . . . more severe price drops and larger 
price reversals than those mostly held by long[-term] investors.”69
Moreover, the prevalence of investors with short investment horizons 
causes, in the aggregate, “market-wide negative shocks.”70
                                                                                                                  
 61. Id. (stating “U.S. industry and the Federal Government are the primary pillars of 
financial support for the U.S. [R&D] enterprise” but “industry support for [its] own basic 
research has stagnated over the last several years”). 
 62. Id. (stating “Federal Government support for academic R&D began falling in 2005 
for the first time in a quarter century” and federal support for basic research has stagnated 
in recent years). 
 63. Id.
 64. See Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 128.  
 65. Id.
 66. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32-35 (2005) (surveying the CFOs of 400 major corpora-
tions and revealing they would have been willing to lay off workers, delay necessary capital 
investment, and cut R&D budgets in order to meet quarterly stock price projections). 
 67. See id.
 68. See Bogle, supra note 4 (“The momentary illusion of the price of a stock took cen-
ter stage, replacing the enduring reality of the company’s intrinsic value—the discounted 
value of its future cash flow.”). 
 69. See Cristina Cella et al., Investors’ Horizons and the Amplification of Market 
Shocks 34 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656723
(presenting statistical evidence that stocks held by short-term investors exhibit higher 
volatility than those held by long-term investors). 
 70. See id. at 1.  
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 Even more troubling, short-termism can incentivize the type of 
excessive risk-taking and financial gimmickry that was prevalent in 
recent financial crises.71 For example, when investors, executives, 
and directors obsessively traded mortgage-backed securities and col-
lateralized debt obligations to generate short-term profits, they failed 
to adequately asses the long-term risks and complexity of their in-
vestments.72 And when investors’ continued demand for ever-higher 
returns could not be met legitimately, they were sometimes met  
by fraud.73 The pressure applied to executives by investors hungry  
for quarterly profits has also been cited as one cause of the disaster  
at Enron.74
 As discussed previously, institutional investors are better posi-
tioned to influence corporate governance than their dispersed prede-
cessors.75 But so long as the investors who determine the fate of their 
directors are unconcerned with the long-term, we should not expect 
corporations to be concerned with the long-term.76 And while many 
have criticized managers for being unresponsive to shareholders, it is 
disingenuous to then disparage those managers for failing to resist 
shareholders’ demands for risky short-term strategies.77
 Although there are some benefits to short-term trading and short-
term corporate governance which should not be disregarded,78 our 
current system can be improved by reducing the overall level of 
short-termism. One reason such a reduction would be beneficial is 
because institutional investors with long-term investment horizons 
are associated with more efficient monitoring than their short-term 
counterparts.79 Additionally, corporations managed for the long-term 
                                                                                                                  
 71. See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 12, at 17; Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, 
at 128 (“[A]s evidenced by the recent financial crisis, short-termism may incentivize exces-
sive risk-taking.”); Strine, supra note 8, at 17 (stating the agenda of short-termists “has been 
on increasing stock prices as fast and as much as possible, even if that requires financial 
gimmickry and risk”).  
 72. Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 128.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 324 n.110 (“Also familiar 
are the accounting shenanigans leading to the doom of Enron and other notorious corpora-
tions. Many blame such bad behavior on the pressure brought on executives by investors 
hungry for quarterly profits.”).  
 75. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 76. See Strine, supra note 8, at 1-2 (“[W]hy should we expect corporations to chart a 
sound long-term course of economic growth, if the so-called investors who determine the 
fate of their managers do not themselves act or think with the long term in mind?”).  
 77. Id. at 17 (“It is contradictory to demand managerial responsiveness to stockholder 
sentiment, and then criticize managers for failing to resist stockholder demands for riskier 
business strategies and more highly levered balance sheets.”). 
 78. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.   
 79. See NAJAH ATTIG ET AL., N. FIN. ASS’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT HORIZON,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL, 3, available at 
https://secure.northernfinance.org/2011/Submissions/modules/request.php?module=oc_ 
program&action=view.php&id=333 (“First, descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
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are more apt than those managed for the short-term at creating sta-
ble employment, wealth, and goodwill.80 Moreover, because most 
well-developed business plans are projected beyond a one- to two-
year horizon,81 a corporation governed with a disproportionate focus 
on short-term earnings is ill-equipped to grow in a sustainable way.  
 The desire to see a renewed corporate focus on long-term strate-
gies is not new. Numerous investors and scholars already support 
a greater level of long-term focus by shareholders and corpora-
tions.82 The remainder of this Note outlines how this goal can actually  
be accomplished. 
IV.   PROMOTING LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A.   Loyalty Shares 
 To contend with short-termism, a proposal is needed that incentiv-
izes long-term stock ownership and allows long-term owners to have 
increased influence. This can be accomplished by allowing public cor-
porations to adopt a “loyalty shares”83 provision in their charter or 
bylaws. If a corporation chooses to adopt a loyalty shares provision, 
two results would follow.     
                                                                                                                  
reveal heterogeneity in the investment horizon of institutional investors. Second, in multi-
variate regressions that control for industry and year fixed effects as well as other firm-
level determinants, we find that a long-term investment horizon is associated with signifi-
cantly lower equity financing costs. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that in-
stitutions with long horizons are associated with more efficient monitoring than institu-
tions with short horizons, possibly because the latter tend to focus more on short-term per-
formance and hence have less incentive to invest in monitoring.”).   
 80. Rodrigues, supra note 14, at 1826 (“It is in everyone’s best interest for firms to be 
run for the long term. Stable firms create stable employment, wealth, and goodwill that 
short-lived companies cannot provide.”); see also Jackson, supra note 74, at 324 (recounting 
how some “corporate boards began to make increasingly short-term decisions that proved 
ruinous not only for the long-term survival of companies themselves, but also for their em-
ployees, creditors, suppliers and other stakeholders”). 
 81. See Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 128 (“Most if not all well-developed busi-
ness plans project the corporation’s goals out beyond a 1- to 2-year horizon.”). 
 82. For example, famed investor Warren Buffett and Vanguard founder John Bogle, 
among many others, formed a coalition which provided recommendations “[e]ncouraging 
investors and intermediaries representing investors to adopt a long-term perspective.” See 
BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, supra note 46, at 1-2. The Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the Del-
aware Court of Chancery called for a longer-term focus by investors and corporations, and 
stated “[m]any of the leading voices in the institutional investor community agree that 
corporations should be managed for the long term.” See Strine, supra note 8, at 3 n.4.  
 83. “Loyalty shares” is a term sometimes used to describe the shares of French com-
panies which double in voting power after a certain period of time. See INST. S’HOLDER 
SERVS. ET AL., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 18
(2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/ 
study/final_report_en.pdf. Although (as will be explained) the “loyalty shares” envisioned 
in this proposal differ from those used in France, the term will be used for the remainder of  
this paper.    
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 First, the voting rights attached to each share of common stock 
would gradually increase over time to ensure corporate boards re-
ceive a healthy amount of influence from long-term shareholders. Ac-
companying provisions related to voting rights ceilings, transparen-
cy, and conflicts of interest would be included as default rules to pre-
vent the potentially negative results of enhanced voting rights. 
  Second, when a corporation adopts the loyalty shares provision, 
the capital gains generated when an investor sells that corporation’s 
stock would be taxed in a gradually decreasing manner—based on 
how long the investor held the stock. The effect would be that share-
holders have adequate incentives to hold stock for the long term. As 
discussed supra, long-term ownership has reached an anemic level.84
Without properly incentivizing investors to hold stock for the long-
term, step one of this proposal might be meaningless; there would 
likely be an insignificant number of investors capable of taking ad-
vantage of the enhanced voting rights. Apart from the benefits that 
enhanced control and reduced tax liability separately confer to the 
shareholder, they also maintain a symbiotic relationship: A share-
holder with increasing control of corporate governance benefits by 
influencing the implementation of sound, long-term corporate policies 
because its investment receives increasingly favorable tax treatment 
over time.  
B.   Enhanced Voting Rights 
1.   The Method of Enhancing Voting Rights 
 Generally speaking, a single share of common public stock is enti-
tled to one vote on any matters brought before the shareholders at a 
shareholder meeting.85 In other words, a shareholder who has main-
tained his ownership for five years wields identical influence—all 
else being equal—to the shareholder who has maintained his owner-
ship for five days. The problem with this model is evident when it 
comes time for shareholders to elect directors to the board.86 If direc-
tors implement a corporate policy that sacrifices some short-term 
earnings in favor of long-term investment, they may be on the hot 
seat at the next annual election. If, as is often the case, much of the 
                                                                                                                  
 84. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
 85. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 72 (1991) (describing the “one share, one vote” principle as “[t]he most 
basic statutory rule of [corporate] voting”).    
 86. Divergent interests between short-term and long-term shareholders could also 
arise in the context of mergers and acquisitions. See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market 
for Shareholder Voting Rights Around Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institu-
tional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 129, 129 (2009) (“A fundamental tenant 
of shareholder governance is the right of shareholders to vote on key managerial decisions 
such as mergers and acquisitions.”).    
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voting stock resides in the hands of investors who have held—and 
only intend to hold—stock for the short term, the directors will likely 
find themselves out of a job.87 Practically, directors may not put forth 
long-term corporate policies in the first place if the threat of removal 
by short-sighted investors looms ahead.  
 To be clear, we cannot know for sure that the investor who held 
stock for five years still intends to hold it in the future, just as we 
cannot know that a new investor is only concerned with short-term 
performance at the expense of long-term growth. But an ex post view 
of the duration of ownership seems like the best proxy for predicting 
the duration of future ownership.88 Moreover, because the tax scheme 
discussed infra would incentivize long-term investing more so than 
the current model does, investors would be more likely to own stock 
for the long-term. One alternative would be to actually penalize 
short-term stock ownership, either by tax penalties or, in the very 
extreme, disgorgement of some short-term profits. But the loyalty 
shares proposal is better because it recognizes that short-term strat-
egies are not void of any benefits. Rather than try to stamp out short-
termism altogether, this proposal uses gradual incentives to entice 
shareholders, while not drastically disincentivizing short-term trad-
ing for those who still desire to do so. The ultimate goal is to reach a 
healthier balance between long- and short-term investment and gov-
ernance than our present system does.   
 A system in which the voting power of a share increases in corre-
lation with the length of time an investor holds the share allows in-
vestors with long-term horizons to have increased influence on corpo-
rate policies. Although the “one share, one vote” method is dominant 
in United States corporations,89 approaches that alter the proportion-
ality between ownership and control have been used before, primarily 
in European and Canadian companies.90 Sometimes referred to as 
“control enhancing mechanisms” (CEMs), these approaches include 
multiple voting rights shares, non-voting shares, pyramid structures, 
and voting rights ceilings, among others.91 Consequently, the task of 
designing the appropriate structure for loyalty shares has some guid-
ance. A study of CEMs showed multiple voting rights shares are 
available in 53% of European Union member states, and have actual-
ly been implemented in 50% of those countries.92 The percentage of 
                                                                                                                  
 87. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (describing the ability of short-term 
investors to influence directors and corporate policy).  
 88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing how using an ex post view of 
duration to empower long-term shareholders in the hopes of alleviating short-termism was 
endorsed in the SEC's proposed Rule 14a-11).
 89. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 72.  
 90. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 92-93, 112. 
 91. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 23.
 92. Id. at 18.  
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companies within a given country who have implemented multiple 
voting rights shares varies drastically, with the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) at the low end (5%), and Sweden at the high end (80%).93
 Importantly, many of the companies that adopt multiple voting 
rights shares do so by creating distinct classes of shares, which are 
bought and sold with the enhanced voting rights already attached.94
On the other hand, the common practice in France—for example—is 
for voting rights to double only when the particular shareholder has 
held the same share for a specific duration of time set out in the com-
pany’s bylaws (the duration must be at least two years).95 In the 
French model, only the specific long-term investor who has owned the 
stock for a set duration maintains the enhanced voting rights; they 
dissolve upon sale.96
 Although primarily a feature of corporate governance in France, 
shares with voting rights that increase after a certain period of own-
ership are (rarely) found in the United States. A study by the Euro-
pean Commission revealed that nine out of 4399 United States com-
panies sampled (0.2%) granted shareholders some form of loyalty 
votes.97 In those companies, common stock generally received five or 
ten votes per share after being held for four years.98      
 This Note’s proposal envisions a more gradual enhancement of 
voting rights. Instead of having a drastic doubling of voting rights 
after two (or more) years, the voting rights attached to a particular 
share would increase by one-twelfth every six months, for up to three 
years.99 As shown infra, increasing voting rights in this manner 
would correlate with the decreasing tax burden on capital gains de-
rived from selling these shares.100 This approach would not suffer 
from the all-or-nothing pitfalls inherent in a model that doubles vot-
ing rights one time after a certain period. Other shareholders and 
potential investors would be able to see how the shareholders with 
enhanced voting rights behave as their corporate control increases 
and can then react as they see fit. Potential investors who see the 
prospect of future value in the way a loyal shareholder’s track record 
of corporate governance emerges would have notice and could invest 
early. On the other hand, a current shareholder who believes the loy-
                                                                                                                  
 93. Id.
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.
 96. Id. at 27. 
 97. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 81.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Under the one-share-one-vote model, an investor with twelve shares would always 
have twelve votes at the annual election. In the loyalty shares model, the shareholder 
would still have twelve votes initially, but would have thirteen votes after six months, four-
teen votes after one year, fifteen votes after one and a half years, sixteen votes after two 
years, seventeen votes after two and a half years, and eighteen votes after three years.   
 100. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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al shareholder’s track record reflects an irresponsible approach to 
corporate governance can exit the company before its stock price 
takes a downturn. 
2.   Concerns with Enhanced Voting Rights 
 Of course, with the presence of any CEM comes an increased abil-
ity for shareholders to gain control of the corporation. As indicated in 
a study by Institutional Shareholder Services et al., some potential 
investors fear that the presence of CEMs in European companies 
could indicate a board might ignore minority shareholders’ interests, 
prevent or restrict takeover bids and their potential share-price up-
side, and create conflicts of interest for significant shareholders and 
their boards.101 The fact that some European crises were made possi-
ble by the existence of dominant shareholders is also concerning, as 
some of them were able to extract benefits from the corporation at 
the expense of other shareholders.102   
 But these issues present less of a threat in United States public 
corporations, where the level of shareholder concentration is general-
ly much lower than in European companies. In 2001, only 2% and 
1.7% of United States companies listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE, 
respectively, were under majority control.103 The next closest country 
or region was the U.K. (2.4%), followed distantly by Sweden (26.3%), 
and with Austria at the high end (68%).104 The percentage of widely 
held companies in several European countries adds further perspec-
tive, revealing Italy at 20%, Germany at 50%, and France at 60%.105
On the other hand, 80% of United States companies are widely 
held.106 These numbers suggest that, when compared with European 
companies, United States public corporations are far less likely to 
have their corporate policies dominated by any one shareholder. 
Moreover, the higher concentration of ownership in European com-
panies is presumably enhanced by the existence of multiple types of 
CEMs, not just multiple voting rights shares (which are more similar 
to loyalty shares).107 And to be sure, there are at least some benefits 
                                                                                                                  
 101. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 87. 
 102. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE PROPOR-
TIONALITY BETWEEN CAPITAL AND CONTROL IN LISTED COMPANIES 15-16 (2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/impact_assessment_122007.pdf.   
 103. MARCO BECHT, CURRENT ISSUES IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2003), 
http://www.ecgi.de/conferences/euro_500_becht.pdf.   
 104. Id. 
 105. Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental 
Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 119 (2007).
 106. Id. 
 107. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 6 (stating “Control Enhancing 
Mechanisms are rather common” in the 464 European companies considered and “[l]arge 
companies in the European Union under analysis feature a variety of CEMs”).  
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to a corporation that is not widely held, including an increased ability 
for shareholders to monitor management.108
 Despite the prevalence of widely held companies in the United 
States, the enhanced voting rights attached to loyalty shares should 
nonetheless be tempered. If not constructed properly, the method of 
providing enhanced voting rights—as described thus far—could even-
tually lead to excessive proportionality differences between voting 
rights and ownership. Such excesses have manifested themselves 
within some European and Canadian companies. For example, a 
shareholder in a large Italian company (i.e., a market capitalization 
of $40 billion) controlled 18% of the votes—making it the largest 
shareholder by far—yet held only 0.7% of the cash flow rights;109 a 
German family controls 25.1% of Volkswagen AG despite owning only 
9.44% of the cash flow rights;110 and even more startling, a single 
family shareholder controlled 50% of the Stockholm stock exchange 
through recourse to CEMs.111 In Canada, drastic proportionality dif-
ferences are readily apparent at companies listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange, including Magna International (where a sharehold-
er owns 1% of equity and 56% of the voting power); Canadian Tire 
(3%, 61%); and Shaw Communications (9%, 78%).112
 Such drastic proportionality differences manifest problems in 
many ways: namely, decreased liquidity;113 prevention of possible 
takeover bids that could ultimately be favorable to non-controlling 
shareholders;114 (as mentioned previously) providing an incentive to 
shareholders whose control greatly exceeds their ownership rights to 
extract value from the company at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders;115 and a misalignment of incentives between the control-
ling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders when the control-
ling shareholder’s voting power greatly exceeds her financial risk.116
                                                                                                                  
 108. See BECHT, supra note 103, at 5. 
 109. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 105, at 119.
 110. Id. at 120-22.  
 111. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 102, at 11. 
     112. See Robert Parizeau, Multiple Voting Shares and Governance, 122 INST. OF 
CORP. DIRECTORS. 5, 6 (2005), available at http://pervinfamilybusiness.com/library/pdf/ 
multiple-voting-shares-governance.pdf.
    113.  See Edith Ginglinger & Jacques Hamon, Ownership, Control and Market Liquidity,
FINANCE 1-4 (forthcoming Dec. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2097795 (studying the “French institutional setting, which is 
characterized by firms with concentrated ownership and large control-ownership devi-
ations” and concluding that “deviation of control from ownership is associated with 
lower liquidity”). 
     114. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 11. 
 115. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 102, at 14. 
 116. See Parizeau, supra note 112, at 6-7 (“In my view, the structure of capital with 
multiple voting shares can only be justified when the controlling shareholder owns a signif-
icant part of the company and, therefore, when that shareholder is much more at risk than 
any other shareholder.”). 
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3.   Preventing Drastic Ownership-Control Proportionality Differences 
 These potential proportionality differences would be constrained 
by including the following default rules in the loyalty shares provi-
sion. First, after three years the voting rights would no longer ex-
pand. For example, an investor who bought 12 shares of common 
stock would see his voting rights enhanced by 50% (to 18 votes) if he 
continued his ownership of those particular shares for three years. 
Because the increments used to enhance voting rights would never 
allow for more than a 50% increase in voting power, the excessive 
proportionality differences cited above would be unobtainable.  
 Second, a voting rights ceiling attached only to loyalty shares 
would ensure dominance does not result from long-term holdings 
alone. United States companies that currently use voting rights ceil-
ings generally set them at 10% of total outstanding shares.117 For the 
sake of simplicity, assume a corporation has 200 shares of outstand-
ing stock and the voting rights ceiling on loyalty shares is set at 9%. 
An investor who held 12 shares for three years would have 18 
votes.118 Therefore, the investor would own 6% of the corporation’s 
stock and have 9% of the voting rights. Note that the investor has 
reached the cap on allowable votes derived from loyalty shares. If the 
investor purchases three more shares of stock, she will have 15 
shares and 21 votes, meaning she will own 7.5% of the outstanding 
stock and 10.5% of the votes. Because the investor previously hit the 
votes ceiling on loyalty shares, the new shares she purchases will not 
receive enhanced voting rights no matter how long she holds them.  
 By applying the voting rights ceiling only to loyalty shares, ambi-
tious shareholders would still be able to increase their control 
through normal market mechanisms (i.e., buying more shares). The 
benefits of allowing shareholders to compete for control of corpora-
tions in which they see value will not be significantly deterred. The 
three-year limit on enhanced voting rights—combined with the vot-
ing rights ceiling on loyalty shares—would allow a healthy, increased 
influence from long-term shareholders, while preventing the dangers 
seen with enhanced voting rights in Europe and Canada. Moreover, 
because these accompanying provisions would be default rules, direc-
tors and shareholders would have the flexibility to adopt different 
limits through private ordering if they are deemed more beneficial.   
                                                                                                                  
 117. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 81. By comparison, common vot-
ing rights ceilings in France include 6%, 10%, and 15%. Id. at 46.  
 118. To recap, the proportion of votes per loyalty share increases by 1/12 after six 
months, 2/12 after one year, 3/12 after one-and-a-half years, 4/12 after two years, 5/12 after 
two-and-a-half years, and 6/12 after three years.  
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4.   Additional Safeguards to Ensure the Success of Loyalty Shares 
 While the foregoing should largely suppress fears that sharehold-
ers with relatively small equity would dominate corporate policy-
making, corporations could mitigate any remaining risks by adopting 
additional measures (via default rules) already used by European 
companies.119 These include standard corporate governance rules de-
signed to prevent conflicts of interest (e.g., rules on related party 
transactions, minority protection in the context of take-over bids, and 
the prevention of market abuse).120 Certain rules could also require 
transparency, such as disclosure obligations for enhanced voting 
rights holders.121 Furthermore, there is an additional safeguard al-
ready present in United States corporate governance: Controlling 
shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to non-controlling shareholders.122
 Although the study by Institutional Shareholder Services et al. 
indicated that many institutional investors had negative opinions of 
multiple voting rights shares in European companies, some investors 
instead indicated they were enticed to invest in companies with 
CEMs, noting the potential for more responsible and committed 
management.123 Importantly, the study did not distinguish investors’ 
sentiments based on the specific kinds of multiple voting rights 
shares available;124 thus, it is impossible to infer from the study how 
investors might feel about loyalty shares specifically. Even assuming 
for the moment there would be some negative sentiment toward loy-
alty shares, the use of France’s relatively similar approach125 is as 
prevalent in large French companies as in recently listed French 
companies, “showing no decline in this practice.”126 Presumably, these 
companies see the increased prospect of long-term sustainability that 
is derived from rewarding long-term shareholders with more control. 
Moreover, it is notable that 52% of the large-cap companies analyzed 
in the study had CEMs while only 26% of recently listed companies 
had them.127 When these numbers are compared with the prevalent 
                                                                                                                  
 119. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 102, at 20. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 21-22. 
 122. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) 
(“[A] shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises 
control over the business affairs of the corporation.”); Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 9, at 
1265 (noting “courts have held that majority shareholders, like corporate officers and direc-
tors, owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority shareholders that precludes them from 
using their positions as controlling shareholders to extract material economic benefits from 
the firm at the minority’s expense”).   
 123. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 91-92. 
 124. Id. at 27 (detailing some of the different types of multiple voting rights shares in 
particular countries, but summarizing respondents’ answers as “multiple voting rights  
shares” generally).   
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. 
 126. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 44. 
 127. Id. at 6. 
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use of France’s relatively similar approach to loyalty shares in both 
large and recently listed companies, it indicates shares with loyalty 
enhanced voting rights are the most preferred type of multiple voting 
rights shares. Furthermore, the fact that roughly 40% of French pub-
lic companies are owned by foreign investors suggests that—as a 
general matter—investors are not hesitant to buy equity in compa-
nies with loyalty shares.128
5.   Concerns About Principles of Shareholder Democracy 
 Critics may argue the enhanced voting rights attached to loyalty 
shares violate the democratic principle of one-share-one-vote.129 But 
this idealistic rationale overlooks the multitude of schemes already 
used by corporations to alter the proportionality between ownership 
and control. For example, many United States corporations already 
issue dual-class shares—where one of the classes has either fewer 
votes than the other or no votes at all—representing in the latter 
case an infinite separation of ownership and control.130 Additionally, 
corporate boards routinely adopt methods to entrench themselves 
and stifle shareholders’ democratic power.131 Finally, shareholders 
sometimes enter into agreements that control, in one way or  
another, how they must vote in director elections and on other mat-
ters,132 and in the case of voting trusts, legal title to shares is actually 
                                                                                                                  
 128. See, The French Investment Climate, AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN FR. (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.amchamfrance.org/theme1.php?idcontenu=107&idpage= (“Foreigners [held] 
approximately 39% percent [sic] of the capital of large publicly traded French companies 
(CAC 40) in December 2008.”); Paris Stock Exchange (PAR) .PA, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/paris-stock-exchange-par-.p.asp#axzz1s8NHLkQv 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (“Now known as the NYSE Euronext (NYX), the Paris Stock 
Exchange trades both equities and derivatives and posts the CAC 40 Index. This index is 
made up of French companies, although nearly half of these are owned by foreign entities.”).  
 129. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 72-73. 
 130. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., supra note 83, at 81.  
 131. See Jay B Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited: 
Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609, 1611 
(2010) (“Between 1990 and 2005, managerial entrenchment levels had remained more or 
less stable. In 2006, however, average entrenchment spiked nearly 50% as measured by an 
index of the six most impactful entrenchment devices: poison pills, staggered boards, exec-
utive golden parachutes, supermajority voting requirements for the approval of mergers, 
and limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws and charters . . . .”)  
(footnote omitted). 
 132. See Annotation, Validity and Effect of Agreement Controlling the Vote of Corporate 
Stock, 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 801-02 (describing various types of voting agreements and stating 
“[a]lthough, in a relatively small number of cases, stockholders’ contracts by which the 
manner in which they may vote their holdings is controlled have been held to be, by their 
nature, fatally defective . . . the modern view on the question whether a stockholder's con-
tract, by which the manner in which he may vote his holdings is controlled, is valid, ap-
pears to be that such contracts contain no inherent defect requiring that they be struck 
down”) (footnotes omitted). 
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transferred to trustees who vote them in accordance with the terms 
of the trust instrument.133
 The difference between those methods and the one proposed in 
this Note is, with the latter, the altered proportionality is premised 
on enhancing a long-term view of corporate governance, a path both 
scholars and prominent investors have strongly endorsed.134 As de-
tailed above, default safeguards—as well as the fiduciary duty a con-
trolling shareholder owes to non-controlling shareholders—would  
prevent abuses.135
C.   Incentivizing Long-Term Ownership Through the Tax Code 
 While enhanced voting rights alone may entice some otherwise 
short-term shareholders to invest over a longer time horizon, the 
competition between institutional investors for clientele would likely 
prevent a major shift.136 Until long-term shareholding becomes more 
enticing from a financial perspective, the hands of institutional in-
vestors will be forced by the marketplace for end-users.137 This hurdle 
could be cleared if institutional investors were able to advertise their 
ability to distribute more favorable after-tax profits to end-users. 
Several authors have supported the use of tax incentives to promote 
long-term holdings.138 However, the manner in which this should be 
done has often gone unexplained.139
These tax benefits should be aimed at the funds’ clients (i.e., their 
end-users) because, first, the sustainability of institutional investors 
depends on attracting clients, and second, institutional investors 
themselves are generally pass-through entities for tax purposes.140
                                                                                                                  
 133. William S. Hochstetler & Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations—An 
Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation 
Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849, 946 (1985). 
 134. See supra note 82.   
 135. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3-4.   
 136. See supra note 38 (describing the intense competition among institutional investors 
for end-users).    
 137. See id.
 138. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 8, at 18 (“Areas that would be productive for examina-
tion include . . . pricing and tax strategies to encourage investing and discourage churning 
by institutional investors and ‘fund hopping’ by end-user investors . . . .”); Sparks & DiTo-
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 139. See Strine, supra note 8, at 18; Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 136. 
 140. See PRENTISS WILLSON, JR. & MARK WINDFELD-HANSEN, STATE TAXATION 
OF PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (PORTFOLIO 1500), available at 
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Taxation: Funds and Fund Management 2010: KPMG, 1 http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/ 
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/mtUSA-Funds-Mtg-taxation-2010.pdf 
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Under the current tax model, an end-user who buys shares in an in-
stitutional investment fund will be taxed on the capital gains gener-
ated from the fund’s sale of stock, whether those gains are distribut-
ed to the end-user or reinvested in the fund.141 If the fund holds the 
stock for over a year before selling it, the gains or losses will be taxed 
at a preferential long-term capital gains rate.142 Generally, long-term 
capital gains are subject to a 15% rate.143 On the other hand, short-
term capital gains are subject to ordinary federal income tax rates, 
which can be as high as 35%.144
Because the preferential capital gains rate for stock plateaus after 
one year, there is no direct financial incentive for investors to hold 
stock for longer durations.145 Moreover, by not providing any incen-
tives prior to the one-year mark, many investors who hold stock for 
short durations (e.g., six months or less) may be indifferent to the 
prospect of long-term capital gains because realization of them is so 
far into the future.  
                                                                                                                  
(describing the ability of investment companies to choose regulated investment company 
status, which affords them pass-through tax treatment). 
 141. See Internal Revenue Serv., Mutual Fund Distributions, 564 IRS FORMS AND PUB-
LICATIONS 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p564--2009.pdf (“You 
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Feb. 18, 2013) (“Under current law, mutual fund shareholders are taxed on a fund’s distri-
butions of income and gains, regardless of whether the distributions are received in cash or 
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 142. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2006) (defining “long-term capital gain” as “gain from the 
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year”).  
 143. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006); see also Topic 409- Capital Gains and Losses, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2012) (“Generally, net capital 
gain is taxed at rates no higher than 15%.”). 
 144. Mutual Fund Taxes, supra note 141. 
 145. See Sparks & DiTomo, supra note 16, at 129 (“Lastly, because preferential capital 
gains rates are available to investors after they hold their investment for only 1 year, in-
vestors are not encourage[d] to hold an investment for longer periods.”). Congress has al-
tered the holding period that triggers the preferential capital gains rate on several occa-
sions. In 1921, the alternative maximum rate for capital gains applied to capital assets 
held for more than two years. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS JCX-4-98
(1998), available at http://www.jct.gov/jct_html/x-4-98.htm. In 1934, the exclusion of vary-
ing percentages of capital gains and losses depended on holding periods of one to two years, 
two to five years, five to ten years, and over ten years. Id. In 1938, Congress implemented 
relevant holding periods of 18 months to two years, and over two years. Id. In 1942, Con-
gress provided preferential treatment for capital assets held for more than six months. Id.
The holding period was increased to nine months in 1977 and one year in 1978—with the 
latter holding period remaining largely in effect up to the present time. Id. The current 
15% rate on capital assets held for over one year is a matter of public debate, and could 
increase to 20% for those assets in the near future, with an 18% rate on gains from  
assets acquired after December 31, 2000 and held for over five years. See Bill Bischoff, 
Preparing for the End of the Bush Tax Cuts, WALL ST. J., (May 18, 2012, 5:32 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303879604577410143118102490.html.  
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 A simple method to ensure investors have reasonable financial 
incentives to hold stock for the long-term is to align the capital gains 
rate on loyalty shares with the incremental periods for enhanced vot-
ing rights previously discussed.146 This can be accomplished by apply-
ing a 17.5% rate to gains on stocks held for over six months; 15% for 
over one year; 12.5% for over one and a half years, 10% for over two 
years, 7.5% for over two and a half years, and 5% for over three 
years. This method would provide short-term traders with a realistic 
incentive to hold stock for a longer period of time, even when the 
current one-year mark seems too distant from their usual invest-
ment horizon to be worth consideration. This method would also 
provide incentives for investors to hold stock for longer than the cur-
rent one-year mark.147
 In fashioning a new capital gains structure, one must be cognizant 
of potential market inefficiencies.148 A capital gains rate of any kind 
can disrupt efficient market allocation through the lock-in effect, dis-
couraging the sale of an asset that would otherwise occur in the ab-
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Letter to Chancellor Alistair Darling, BUSINESSZONE (Oct. 15, 2007, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.businesszone.co.uk/item/174278 (stating concerns in a letter signed by the Di-
rector General of the British Chambers of Commerce, the Director General of the CBI lob-
bying organization, the National Chairman of the Federation of Small Businesses, and the 
Director General of the Institute of Directors). Note that the tax scheme outlined in this 
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 148. See generally George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: 
Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419, 424-29 (1993) (reviewing 
some of the existing literature on the effect of capital gains rates on the market). “Econo-
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sence of taxation.149 By adding more increments to the current one-
year model, overall market efficiency could theoretically be disrupted 
even more than may already be the case.150 Additionally, an argu-
ment can be made that the market loses efficiency whenever more 
complexity is added to the tax code.151
 But drawing such conclusions is risky because much of the tradi-
tional literature on the subject is inconclusive.152 Regardless, certain 
features of the model presented in this Note should alleviate many of 
those concerns. First, the 15% tax rate on stocks held for over one 
year, which Congress has already deemed appropriate, is preserved. 
Second, any potential inefficiencies can be justified by the goal of 
gradually increasing long-term corporate governance. As argued 
throughout this Note, decreasing short-termism to a healthier level 
would have widespread benefits. Consequently, policy-makers should 
be willing to sacrifice some level of potential market efficiency if it 
would result in a more beneficial financial sector overall. Third, the 
proposed tax scheme does not significantly increase complexity. In-
stead, the investor is provided with a consistent and simple capital 
gains scheme. Well-respected and highly-influential investors have 
already endorsed the use of modified capital gains rates that encour-
age long-term share ownership.153 By aligning the capital gains rates 
for loyalty shares with the accompanying enhanced voting rights, in-
vestors and corporations could easily weigh the pros and cons associ-
ated with loyalty shares before deciding whether to adopt them.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Because public corporations play a vital role in the American 
economy, the focus by institutional investors on short-term earnings 
at the expense of long-term growth presents serious problems. These 
include decreased investment in R&D and capital infrastructure, as 
well as the termination of employees. Unless major changes are made 
to the corporate landscape, there is no reason to think these problems 
will subside in the future. Although the issue of short-termism has 
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not gone unnoticed, many legislative efforts and scholarly papers 
have failed to provide adequate solutions.  
 This Note proposes using the tax code to entice more shareholders 
to invest long-term and then granting them increased control via en-
hanced voting rights. By learning from the experiences of European 
and Canadian companies with other types of control enhancing 
mechanisms and incorporating many of their procedural safeguards 
as default rules, the potential pitfalls of this proposal are avoided. 
Adoption of this proposal would ultimately cause a renewed focus on 
long-term corporate governance, without eliminating many of the 
benefits that accompany short-term trading. 
